


INTERNATIONALE POLITIK SPECIAL

IP SPECIAL • Nr. 2/2020 • Sylke Tempel Fellowship – 2728



Israel and Germany in the US Election Year

Essays of the Sylke Tempel Fellows 2020

In Praise of Complexity

By Martin Bialecki, Editor-in-Chief

For the first time, Internationale Politik (IP) is collecting the texts of the Sylke Tempel Fellows in a special edition. There are many good reasons for doing so, the proximate one being the name of the outstanding former editor-in-chief of this magazine. “Israel and Germany in the Year of the US Presidential Election: National Narratives, Identities and Foreign Policy” – that was the title of the call for entries for this year’s edition. Sylke Tempel was connected to this triad of countries in a special way, and there is no term in this volume that she wouldn’t have been able to ask 100 clever questions about, give guidance on, initiate debates about, humorously add to, or coolly dissect.

The second reason is the complexity of the task. This journal strives for clarity and conciseness; yet it remains the right medium for presentation and analysis even when some complexity simply cannot be simplified. The German-Israeli relationship is certainly one of those complex topics, as are Israel’s history, Israel’s relationship to Muslims, the role of the USA, Anglo-Saxon schools of thought, and much more. We cordially invite you to pack the essays contained here in your luggage and embark on a journey through this vast field.

The third reason: the authors. Six young people – three women, three men, from Israel and Germany – have dived into traditions, history, into a tangle of questions. Their essays repeatedly bear witness to the fact that such disputes need not have anything old about them, nor anything bland. The Fellows’ common spirit was inspiring. We – and the Fellows – would have liked to have experienced more of it in person, but after all, the works in this volume, like so much else, emerged under the shadow of the coronavirus.

Fourth, and finally: you, our readers. With the IP Specials, IP offers you a wide range of regionally or thematically focused issues, all in the context of our core brand, foreign policy. We are very pleased to have been able to create a booklet in the spirit of Sylke Tempel so close to the beginning of this new path.



A Plea Against Truth

On the Sylke Tempel
Fellowship Program

By *Tamara Or*

All right, I admit it, the title is provocative. Sylke Tempel, in whose honor the German-Israeli Future Forum Foundation has established the Sylke Tempel Fellowship Program, was provocative too. In one of her astute remarks on the “Trump Method” she explained – in the spirit of Hannah Arendt – that we would be well advised to keep the concept of truth out of political discussions in the media and leave it to the philosophers or prophets. She was right. Only in the plural does the concept of truth in political discourse do justice to democratic aspirations.

Yet hardly any other term in public political debate enjoys such popularity at the moment – closely entwined with its antonym. Joe Biden called Donald Trump a liar in the presidential candidates’ first debate. Trump referred to the “fake news” directed against him. In the run-up to the third parliamentary elections in a year and a half, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu assured the Israeli public that the court case against him would bring “the whole truth” to light. And at the so-called hygiene demonstrations in Germany, tens of thousands of people are protesting alongside conspiracy theorists who, contrary to all evidence, claim to have discovered “the truth”. Their abstruse, partially inhumane, unenlight-

ening myths spread in digital space as if at the speed of light. Those unburdened by knowledge and scruples simply run faster.

Behind the proclamation of truth hides often not the result of a knowledge-based process, but rather the claim to have sole authority to interpret a fact, the raising of one’s own perspective to the highest level of legitimacy, which alone is granted the quality of truth. Journalism does not look for the one truth, but for the many un-narrated stories, for a variety of perspectives on a subject. This is exactly what we expect from our Sylke Tempel Fellows, who – as young experts, journalists and media figures – will continue to make their voices heard across national borders and in social and foreign policy debates in Germany and Israel.

There were three countries – Germany, Israel and the USA – that were particularly close to Sylke Tempel’s heart. She lived and worked in all three of them. Together with our cooperation partners (see p. 51) and under the patronage of the Atlantik-Brücke Chairman and former German Federal Minister Sigmar Gabriel, this year our fellows examined individual aspects of the overarching topic, “Israel and Germany in the Year of the US Presidential Election: National Narratives, Identities and Foreign Policy” with each other and with their mentors, Raphael Ahren, Dr. Nicola Albrecht, Dr. Max Czollek, Kerstin Müller, Christina Pohl, and Adar Primor. In their contributions, they illustrate current shifts in boundaries and new debates on legitimacy, both in all three countries and in their relations to each other.

The plea against truth is a plea for a diversity of perspective within the framework of the rule of law and for a democratic culture of balance, in which it is not about the one truth, but about existing together in the best possible way – values for which the Fellowship Program stands and for which Sylke Tempel, too, fought and lived.

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With Heart and Mind

A greeting from Sigmar Gabriel

In his acceptance speech for the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade, the Israeli writer Amos Oz said something that I liked very much because it was both idealistic and realistic. He was interested in how, in his home country of Israel, but also everywhere else in the world, the most diverse people can live together in peace without giving up their differences: “There ought to be ways of fulfilling various legitimate yearnings for identity and self-definition within a comprehensive commonwealth of all humankind. We ought to be building a polyphonic world, rather than a cacophony of separate, selfish nation states.” The sentiment is realistic because it doesn’t play down the differences between people; it is idealistic because it maintains the belief that difference without antagonism is possible. This approach seems to me to be a good starting point for a world in which dissonance is becoming louder and louder.

In order to reconcile differences, it is first and foremost essential to understand them. The feeling of belonging – to a family, a group, a nation – is very important to people. Everyone has an identity, however she or he defines it. This can be the motor for many things – for better or worse, for things big and small. It is essential to get to the bottom of it if one wants to understand what drives people and ultimately politics. This is especially true of the complex, multifaceted network of relationships between Germany, Israel, and the USA. The connections between these nations are on the one hand determined by geopolitical and economic

considerations. On the other hand there is history, religion, ethnicity, identity, not natural reasons for national belonging, but rather factors that influence the reality of people’s lives and also influence their attitude towards politics. This side of things is at least as important and should not be ignored by brute political decisions. Otherwise there will continually be unresolved conflicts.

Germany and Israel are forever bound together by the injustice of the Nazi regime and the horrors of the Holocaust. This history not only shapes relations on a diplomatic level; it lives on even today in the memories and stories of families in both countries, a history of grief and anger, guilt and responsibility. But it is not only the history from 1933 onwards that plays a role: identifying with and loving Germany and Europe, as many Jews did before they fled or were cruelly murdered, is also part of the complicated mosaic of identity in this relationship. Last but not least, there are also the relationships that are being newly formed today, by young Israelis and Germans who – certainly never completely unbiased, but still curious and open-minded – are coming closer together.

Israel’s relations with the United States of America are characterized by close family ties between the two countries and the American Jewish diaspora’s connection to the State of Israel. But the Evangelical movement, which at times has an exceedingly ambivalent relationship with Judaism, influences American-Israeli relations as well. Donald Trump made Israel a central theme back as early as his first campaign, and after he won the presidency, he quickly carried out the controversial recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the relocation of the U.S. embassy to the city. In this current election year, American-Israeli relations are once again playing a prominent role.

The Trump administration, which in other respects tends to consider international cooperation superfluous, sees itself here as playing its traditional role as a successful mediator that can make a



Sigmar Gabriel was Foreign Minister, Vice-Chancellor, Minister of Economics and Environment, Chairman of the SPD; currently he is Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke, among others.

breakthrough in the Middle East through skillful and confidential negotiations. The fact that Israel and the United Arab Emirates want to establish diplomatic relations – and that Bahrain, another Arab state, has now also declared its willingness to do so – should undoubtedly be welcomed. And yet, it remains impossible to imagine a path for Israel to make peace with all its neighbors if the Palestinians are not involved in the process.

For Israel's contentious domestic political situation, too, is shaped by a variety of identities. The gulf that many Jews and Muslims see between themselves is closely interwoven with the history of the State of Israel, with the precarious situation of the Palestinians, and with Israel's relations with the Arab world.

We have to engage with and understand all these perceptions and affiliations. Not every identity is, as already discussed, something positive, something innocent. A misguided search for identity can fuel conflicts, populism, hatred of strangers; it can become very dangerous. At the same time, a sense of belonging can also lead people to work to abolish injustice and discrimination. We can observe both phenomena in Europe, in Israel, in the USA. It is only logical that this year's Sylke Tempel Fellowship is dedicated to the theme "Israel and Germany in the Year of the US Presidential Election: National Narratives, Identities and Foreign Policy". The media professionals from Germany and Israel who received the fellowship illuminate aspects of the relationship that we

should not ignore. They address Jewish identity, the way Germany, Israel and the USA deal with minorities, the rapprochement between Jews and Muslims, populism, the role of the Jewish diaspora, and the German heritage of Jewish Israelis. It is encouraging that young people are pursuing these questions, which demonstrate the complexity of political reality and thus enrich the debate. I am pleased that the fellowship is able to support such profound work. Good journalism is an essential part of our democratic life.

Sylke Tempel, who passed away far too early, always took an alert, critical view of the trio discussed here. She traveled widely, got to know the countries and the people, their history and present. The reason her criticism was so captivating was not only because she was so perceptive, but because Germany, Israel and the USA really were close to her heart. Without mincing her words or sugarcoating anything, she advocated for relations between our countries and against narrow-mindedness. And what made her stand out was her conviction that one can argue constructively with almost anyone. This is exactly what we have to do when we stand up for democracy, for peace, and for a tolerable coexistence of the most different people. And it seems to me that the works in this volume are an excellent continuation of the culture of debate with heart and mind that Sylke Tempel so inimitably mastered. Germany, Israel and the USA: the relationship between these three countries is multifaceted, and only by addressing and understanding all facets can we overcome dissonance and nationalistic selfishness – in the spirit of Amos Oz.

Between Liberalism and Populism

Militant Liberals, Naïve Populists: The Transformation of Liberalism and Populism in the United States, Germany, and Israel


An essay by Itamar Ben Ami

One of the unanticipated results of the coronavirus crisis is a certain retreat in the power of populism. Whereas populist leaders like Trump and Netanyahu failed to deal with the pandemic, many liberal regimes proved their superiority. Liberalism, which Carl Schmitt accused of an inability to deal with the “state of emergency,” proved that in times of crisis it is actually orderly decision-making processes based on objective experts, rather than popular enthusiasm, that enable the handling of threats. Now (as of September 2020), in a kind of historical irony, the United States and Israel – “the chosen peoples,” as described by sociologist Todd Gitlin – are enviously observing Merkel’s Germany.

The coronavirus failure of the populist regimes

is now evident in the polls. Trump is trailing behind his establishment rival Biden. In Israel mass demonstrations have erupted against the regime of Netanyahu, who for the first time in years is genuinely threatened with losing power. Israel and the United States are at a fateful crossroads: populism or liberalism, a continuation of the revolution or a return to the foundations that have guided the global order in recent decades. However, as historian Samuel Moyn recently warned, the hope that populism will simply disappear is groundless. Such a hope assumes that populism is a deviation from the global order, a strange and incomprehensible anomaly. It would be more accurate to treat populism as part of the global order itself.

It is tempting to understand the coronavirus



pandemic as confirmation of the usual analyses of the types of political logic that guide populist and liberal regimes. The populists claim that liberalism replaces the public will with technocrats, who rule in the name of economic efficiency that doesn't suit the public's desires. They advocate restoring democracy to the demos, with more direct representation for the masses. Liberals, on the other hand, favor indirect representation. They emphasize third-sector organizations that guarantee the preservation of rights, the nurturing of academe and expertise, and a strong and apolitical professional officialdom more committed to the state than to the elected government.

However, the boundaries between liberalism and populism are less clear than is thought. Already in the 1920s a number of German philosophers claimed that liberalism's flattering image of itself, as rational and believing in intellectual discussion aimed at reaching agreements, is inaccurate. Liberalism's tendency to declare an all-out war against its enemies, they argued, is essential to liberal logic. It is rather populism which is revealed to be an optimistic and naïve system, failing to cope with crises. Moreover, the differences between liberalism and populism are not as profound as they first seem. Not only do both ideologies confront a similar set of questions, but the boundaries between the two are fluid and changeable.

The following article focuses on the troika of Germany, the United States and Israel, and on two episodes of relations between liberalism and populism, which illustrate closeness or at least a connection between the two ideologies. This focus will try to shed light on the present moment, which fluctuates between liberalism and populism. The fluctuation among these three countries illustrates the international nature of populism, which usually likes to consider itself a local and authentic movement. In fact, populism is a patently international movement. Without the exchange of ideas and people brought about by globalization – which it attacks day and night – populism would not even have come into being.

The first part of the article will focus on the

moment when liberalism and populism became two rival movements reacting to one another. As historian Udi Greenberg recently demonstrated, there is nothing self-evident in this confrontation, whose roots must be sought in the Weimar Republic in Germany – the same Germany that is today considered the savior of liberalism. After the collapse of the Weimar Republic, exiled philosophers exported the oppositional configuration to the United States and Israel. The second part will focus on the present relationship between libera-

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lism and populism in the United States and Israel. It will analyze the transformation of the Israeli right, inspired and influenced by developments in America, and its choice of populist directions at the expense of a liberal-conservative orientation. Netanyahu, I argue, merely reflects the changing logic of American right-wing politics.

The Weimar century in the United States and Israel

In recent years the Weimar Republic has been capturing the imagination of political theoreticians worldwide, who claim that the foundations of our political configuration originated in Weimar. The Weimar Republic was a place where a divided society, traumatized by World War I, first experimented with mass democracy. Weimar is often identified as “a republic without republicans,” i.e. a place where assorted radicals, who shared a disdain for the liberal democratic system, assembled. Weimar’s “Golden Twenties” were known mainly for their cultural avant-gardism – in literature, the arts and philosophy – which tended to disdain the bourgeoisie and the parliamentary and liberal system identified with them.

But in recent years Weimar is drawing attention not only as the birthplace of reactionary or populist thought, but as the principal arena of liberal thought as well. In effect, as Jens Hacke recently demonstrated, precisely because neither of the parties to the coalition that created the Weimar Republic was enthusiastic about the forced marriage, they invested considerable thought in preserving the regime even in crisis conditions. Liberalism was considered a suitable solution. Liberalism was therefore not a naïve and optimistic political approach, as its populist enemies claim, but a realistic tool for disciplining hostile political groups characterized by mutual distrust.

In particular, liberalism served as a barrier to direct participation of the masses. The masses in Weimar were seen as a dynamic and undisciplined force, easily manipulated by demagogues of every political stripe. That is why Jews were disproportionately represented in liberal Weimar. As historian Philipp Nielsen recently demonstrated, many Jews who feared the antisemitism of the masses supported versions of elitist and indirect political representation, and even the old imperialistic order, due to their barriers against mass participation. It was probably the earliest Jewish version of skepticism about populism.

The Nazi rise to power initiated a wave of mass

emigration from Germany – of over 300,000 people. Some sectors in Germany, such as the academic or cultural world, have yet to recover from this emigration. The prevailing belief – or hope – is that philosophers who experienced the trauma of emigration will support tolerant ideologies. In contemporary critical theory, the idea of “exile” is contrasted to the idea of “sovereignty”, and signals critical approach to the power of the state. Weimar’s exiled philosophers, however, did just the opposite. They swore that the trauma of the collapse of liberalism would not be repeated and tried to find ways of preventing mass participation.

That is the context of the “Weimar Century,” as Greenberg defines it, in the United States: an attempt to shape a liberal democracy whose survival is not endangered by the masses. Liberal democracy was shaped militantly, against forces trying to destroy it. Political scientist John Gunnell describes this as a cultural revolution brought to America by the German exiles. Whereas previously the Americans, in a spirit of pragmatism, thought that democracy excels in moral indifference, these exiles tried to anchor democracy in metaphysical considerations, as they thought that this was the only way to prevent it from collapsing. Liberal democracy thus posited a Manichean system, identifying itself with the good and its populist and communist enemies with evil.

Weimar, accordingly, transformed liberalism from an anti-ideology to a militant ideology aimed primarily against populism. Greenberg places the invention of the idea of “militant democracy,” which had consequences in the United States, in Germany and even in Israel, in that context. The exiled thinkers presented liberal democracy as a kind of super-ideology to rival the Communist regime, which they felt was trying to destroy them. “They ambitiously argued that democracy was the sole legitimate regime, one that had the right to violently crush its enemies,” writes Greenberg. Liberal militancy illustrates that as opposed to the claims of the populists, liberalism does not entail the disappearance of the “political.”

A similar process took place not only in the Uni-

ted States but in Israel too. For years the German immigration to Israel was identified with a commitment to centrist liberal opinions; however, as Nitzan Lebovic demonstrated recently, the liberal emigres brought with them considerable ideology militancy. The influence of Weimar philosophers was in evidence mainly in the Israeli Supreme Court, which had broad German representation. The Supreme Court was considered a representative of liberalism, but its interpretation of liberal ideology was traumatic and militant. That is why, for example, the court approved the military regime's control over Israeli Arabs until 1966. Israeli liberalism, thus, was also shaped as a regime opposed to mass participation and waging war against its enemies.

The configuration of liberalism vis-à-vis populism therefore originated in Weimar and was exported to Israel and the United States. The German exiles' fear of populism was not solely theoretical. The emigration from Germany also brought German populists – at least potentially – to Israel and the United States. In my doctoral thesis I illustrated how various streams in Israel's religious politics were influenced by the “conservative revolution” in Germany and wanted to harness popular enthusiasm to create a revolutionary politics. I connect these movements, historically and textually, to later streams of revolutionary popular politics in Israel, for example in the Israeli settlement movement in the occupied territories.

On the other hand, sometimes the boundaries between populism and liberalism remained fluid. Philosopher Yeshayahu Leibowitz, for example, is now known as a harsh critic of Israeli policy in the occupied territories and a supporter of liberal politics. However, as a student in Germany's Weimar Republic, he belonged to a religious group that aspired to establish the “Volksgemeinschaft der Thora” and to found a theocracy in Palestine. Is there a connection between his later liberal opinions and his early populist ideas? If we look at the United States, we will notice a similar phenomenon in the case of Hans Morgenthau. According to several scholars, the German Jewish philosopher,

who was one of the architects of America's realistic approach in the Cold War, was in the late 1920s the source of Carl Schmitt's definition of the political as a distinction between a friend and an enemy – a basic populist configuration.

Liberalism and populism could be therefore fluid concepts that enable fluctuation between them. This also demonstrates that each of these opinions holds a mistaken image of itself. As opposed to the accusations of populism, liberalism is in fact an attitude that is not committed to naïve and optimistic ideas of progress. In fact, liberalism actually turns out to be a clearly pessimistic concept; it has a militant approach, which divides the world between enemy and friend, and must constantly be on guard in the face of the danger of its collapse. As opposed to liberalism, it is actually populism that is an optimistic approach that demonstrates great naivete – the same naivete about which it tirelessly warns liberalism. Despite its attempt to praise the “state of emergency,” the constant revolutionary nature of populism prevents it from effectively dealing with crises – a phenomenon discussed by exiled legal scholar Ernst Fraenkel already in the 1930s.

In summary, the militant liberalism that guided the United States and Israel was shaped by the weakness of populism as a political system. Weimar therefore apparently confronts us with a tough choice: militant liberalism versus naïve populism. Is that the path facing democracy today?

The United States and Israel: the rise of populist conservatism

It is difficult to point to a direct line connecting exiles from Weimar and today's populist politics. Yet it seems that at least in three senses, the ghosts of Weimar continue to haunt contemporary politics in America and Israel. First, even today liberalism and populism remain oppositional configurations, standing directly against each other. Second, Americans and Israelis are basing themselves on clear Weimar configurations when they return to a direct and populist mode of politics. And third, populism continues more than ever to be an inter-

Conservatives may see an opportunity in populism – for example in the attempt to undermine the foundations of globalization

national movement – an ironic fact for a movement that championed the struggle against globalism and internationalism. This is evident mainly in developments in the American and Israeli right.

We'll begin with the United States. There are American populists who see themselves as the heirs to the conservative political ideas. The conservative movement in the United States, despite its pretensions to a long tradition, developed mainly after World War II, with the involvement of German emigres, among others. It was related to a Christian revival on the one hand and ideological hawkishness on the other, which tried to preserve American ideals in the face of the New Deal and the danger of Communism. In the 1960s and 1970s there was a second wave of conservatism in the United States, as part of what Jürgen Habermas called the "New Right." This wave reacted mainly

to the cultural revolution in America, and tended to espouse more activist and less elitist opinions.

There are scholars who have tried to connect the present wave of populism to the American conservatism. In the United States the various conservative streams are anchored in research institutes, which are currently divided according to their attitude toward Trump. It is also connected to a doctrinal quarrel around the legacy of exiled Jewish philosopher Leo Strauss, whose American students turned to opposing paths. While various neocons, mainly those identified with the Bush administration, opposed Trump – others, such as the influential Claremont Institute, see Trumpism as an opportunity to implement policy that in their opinion is crucial for restoring America to greatness.

The connection between conservatives and populists may be surprising. Conservatism by nature tends to cultural elitism that does not suit the Trump administration's ignorance. That's why for years it was more conceivable for conservatives to form an alliance with various versions of classical liberalism rather than with populism. But on clear days, the conservatives may indeed see an opportunity in populism. Conservatives who tend to have separatist agenda in the international arena, for example, will support a populism that is attempting to undermine the foundations of globalization. Conservatives who despise government intervention are likely to welcome the populist undermining of state institutions. By stressing the idea of liberty against the state, they are likely to imagine forms of community that oppose the establishment, which they consider foreign to the people.

The American conservative agenda has moved from qualified support for militant liberalism to a degree of support for populism that focuses on the idea of liberty. This tendency is illustrated in other contemporary phenomena of fluidity between liberalism and populism. There's a reason why the German AfD (Alternative for Germany) party began as a neoliberal movement, and on the other hand, why Marine Le Pen expressed opposition

to the invasion of Iraq. A series of clearly liberal opinions, such as suspicion of the state, eschewing of international intervention, and preference for a free market over centralized institutions – could deteriorate quickly into populism, which provides a different framework for precisely those positions. These are exactly the processes experienced by the American right.

Let's look at Israel. It's easy to attribute Netanyahu's populist policy to the fact that he is facing indictments for corruption. However, this interpretation neglects the profound transformation that the Israeli right has undergone in recent years, inspired by events in the United States, which reached a peak in the transition from conservatism to populism. As a rule, Prime Minister Netanyahu is very attentive to events in the United States, where he lived for many years. During his term as prime minister – the longest in Israel's history – Netanyahu keeps reinventing himself in accordance with surrounding Anglo-American trends. In the 1990s he became a young leader who supported economic liberalism in the spirit of Clinton and Blair. During Obama's tenure – he became a type of security hawk who continued the spirit of the Bush neocon administration. The beehive that surrounded Netanyahu in the previous decade belonged for the most part to the American neocon establishment.

In recent years, on the other hand, Netanyahu positions himself as a parallel of sorts to Donald Trump. His militant foreign policy has been replaced by attacks against allegedly domestic enemies such as the Supreme Court and the Israeli left. Israel no longer justifies the occupation in “hard” terms of security, in the spirit of Yitzhak Shamir or the Labor movement, but uses ultranationalist rhetoric, which stresses the nation's power. That is the main context for the legislation of the Nation-State Law, as illustrated recently by Israeli-Arab political scientist Raef Zreik. For a while, Bibi even dyed his hair blond and called his opponents “sourpusses” (literally pickles), perhaps in order to get rid of the pessimistic image that better described his policy for years.

In an important analysis recently published by Israeli essayist Assaf Sagiv, he explained the connection between the transformation of the Israeli right and the changes in the American right. In recent years, there has been an effort by conservative American foundations, like the Tikvah Fund, to promote a populist version of right-wing identity in Israel, based on Orthodox foundations. Many settler leaders, while presenting simply a militant and Trumpist version of singling out domestic enemies who are subverting the nation, now claim that they are “conservative”. This xenophobic version is backed by an Evangelistic reading of the Jewish holy texts, which grants legitimacy to Jewish supremacy in the occupied territories. Sagiv contrasts this populist-conservative approach with more authentic conservatism, which tends to pessimism and refrains from committing to a permanent political stance.

The populist change in the Israeli right brings it closer to cooperation with antisemites and antisemitic symbols. In recent years Israel became

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identified with the anti-liberal Visegrád Group. Israel's government even cooperated with an antisemitic campaign in Hungary against George Soros. Former Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked, who promoted a profound reform that undermined the independence of the legal system, did not hesitate to model a perfume called "Fascism" in an election campaign last year, claiming that it doesn't smell so terrible. Yair Netanyahu, the prime minister's son, has a popular Twitter account that compares leftists to traitors. He recently appeared in AFD ads that talk about "Judeo-Christian civilization". The political violence in Israel has also recently changed in nature. It no longer comes from the radical religious community, but from rabble in the spirit of hooligan football fans who beat up participants in anti-Netanyahu demonstrations.

Despite the influence of the American right on the Israeli right, Israeli populism apparently has two unique characteristics. First, the switch to a populist direction clearly enables the Israeli right to legitimize an aggressive policy vis-a-vis the Palestinians. After even veteran defenders of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, warned that if Israel annexes territories it will lose its moral superiority, the populist constellation is trying to defend annexation by making it part of an overall war of civilizations. Second, opposition to globalization fills an existential need for Israel – because if the state becomes global, it will stop being Jewish. As Yaacov Yadgar wrote, "the sovereign Jews" depend mainly on the Jewishness of their nation state in order to remain Jewish.

To some degree, Israel's fate really does depend on the nation state project, which counts populists among its enthusiastic defenders. Perhaps if Israel wishes to remain a Jewish state, it has to be the world's last nation state, and therefore also populist. However, its method of guaranteeing that requires adopting the worst elements of American populism, and a loss of any connection to Jewish tradition. On the other hand, this once again illustrates the fluidity and the transition between liberalism and populism. If in the past version of Netanyahu he could present himself as a clear re-

presentative of neoliberalism, he now continues to pursue the same policy by populist means – inspired by America. It would be a mistake to attribute that only to his cynicism.

Summary: The changing paths of Liberalism and populism

The crisis of legitimacy, and the question of democracy's legitimacy in general, are a new phenomenon of the past 100 years. The dispute between liberalism and populism touches upon profound contradictions in mass politics, and therefore has no clear solution. Modern politics is based on popular legitimacy but is limited to a national community. It speaks in the name of human rights, but grants only civil rights, for political reasons. It presumes to represent the entire people of the state, but in fact excludes various groups from centers of decision making. It speaks in the name of humanity but is concerned with power.

Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that liberalism and populism offer clearly opposing answers to these basic questions. It is incorrect to claim that liberalism sees politics as based on reason, dealing with interests, guaranteeing justice and attempting to achieve universalism, whereas for populism politics is based on will, deals with identity, promises desire and aims at particularity. The triple case of Germany, the United States and Israel makes it clear that both liberalism and populism offer various and partial versions of these configurations. The question of the political, apparently, still awaits a solution.

Majority and Minorities

Pluralistic societies such as Israel, the USA, and Germany are very different, but they are all based on the diversity that minorities bring with them.

An essay by Hanno Hauenstein

The question of the relationship between the majority society and minorities is moving ever further into the center of political processes, at the latest since the so-called refugee crisis and the various debates on integration (or disintegration) that followed. At the beginning of 2016, the Greek migration minister Ioannis Mouzalas put the question in these terms: “We can choose two paths. Either we go into the future as a Europe of tolerance and human rights – or we collapse into a Europe defined by xenophobia and fear.”

The political developments of the following years showed that this question has largely unfolded in the latter direction, meaning towards xenophobia and fear through the election of Donald Trump in the US and the growth of right-wing populist

forces in Germany and Israel.

The corona pandemic of 2020 marked a second break. It exacerbated existing inequalities and again raised the question of the relationship between the majority and minorities. Answering that question led to other fundamental ones: about citizenship, participation, and political language.

Unequal treatment in the corona crisis

In early August 2020, I interviewed Israeli sociologist Eva Illouz about the protests that had broken out in Israel a few weeks earlier. Since the outbreak of the pandemic, Illouz had distinguished herself as a sharp critic of Israeli corona politics. She explained that the primary reason for the protests



was Israelis' loss of trust in the leadership of the Netanyahu government. In our conversation, she also drew attention to an aspect of the conflict that, surprisingly, was rooted not in discrimination but rather in the preferential treatment of a minority. In Israel, she said – and the pandemic had made this even clearer – there was “outrageously unequal treatment” of secular and religious people: “When secular schools were closed and even outdoor yoga classes were forbidden,” she said, “orthodox communities were allowed to reopen Yeshivas.”

The reason for this discrepancy, which Illouz also sees in other areas of society, is to be found in the asymmetry of the relationship between the Israeli state and the secular citizens. Unlike their religious compatriots, secular citizens have to do military service, which swallows up their time and income. Illouz says a break with this asymmetry is very unlikely in the current situation, one “unprecedented in Israel,” where a prime minister accused of corruption is attacking the courts.

Antagonisms of citizenship

As the political scientist Vyacheslav Konstantinov showed in the journal *Osteuropa* (9-11/2019) in his essay “Polling Place Israel – The Political Voice of Immigrants”, Israeli immigrants from former Soviet states in particular often consider ultra-Orthodox Haredim “moochers” who supposedly contribute nothing to society – a viewpoint that is undoubtedly susceptible to anti-Semitic ways of thinking. In addition, incidentally, the deferment of military service is not a privilege for all ultra-orthodox people: it often makes young men even more dependent on the respective religious authorities.

Nevertheless, Illouz's reflections offer insight into the complex antagonisms that minorities in Israel are caught up in. They also refer to Israel's Jewish self-definition. It is well-known that Israel, as a Jewish state, is built on an ethno-religious foundation. Jewish ethnicity is a hallmark of the

majority. The so-called National State Law of 2018 anchored this in legislation. According to this law, the Jewish population has the sole legal claim to Israel. Arabic – which Tsafrir Cohen, director of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in Tel Aviv, described to me as “the lingua franca of the region” – was dropped as the second official language. Critics like constitutional law expert Mordechai Kremnitzer and even Israel's President Reuven Rivlin warned that the law endangered Israeli democracy.

The Arab-Israeli writer Sayed Kashua criticized it too, arguing that through this law Israel is trying to “reject by definition every member of a minority who wants to be part of this state, even if, as I do, they write literature in Israel's own language.” The law, Kashua wrote in *The New York Times*, ultimately prevents the possibility of multiculturalism in Israel.

Multiculturalism as a model?

The question here is whether multiculturalism in Israel was ever an desired – or viable – outcome. Is the unique purpose of this state not rather to be a refuge for those persecuted by anti-Semitism? What rights can non-Jewish minorities claim against this complex historical-political background?

Professors of politics Yoav Peled and José Brunner were already thinking about this in 2000. In the essay “Culture is not Enough: A Democratic Critique of Liberal Multiculturalism”, they identified four minority groups that are decisive for Israel: Palestinian-Arab Israelis (today one-fifth of the Israeli population), Mizrahim (Jews from Arab countries), ultra-orthodox Haredim, and national-religious settlers. Today one would probably also have to include immigrants from African countries. According to UNHCR figures from August 2020, almost 80,000 refugees have applied for asylum in Israel in the past 15 years, especially from Eritrea and Sudan – just under one percent of them received refugee status.

According to Peled and Brunner, the idea of a “liberal multiculturalism” based on negative freedom in the form of abstract rights is too shallow a concept. Rather, the goal should be to achieve a “democratic multiculturalism” based on social practices. The result should not be assimilation or integration, but the development of a pluralistic culture. Insofar as Israel’s understanding of democracy is oriented towards Western countries, these parameters should also apply here.

Ofer Waldman, journalist and former chairman of the New Israel Fund (NIF) Germany, explained to me that he does not consider the issue of ethnic

justification for citizenship in Israel to be particularly unusual: “This discussion is not so different from the question of what should be written above the Reichstag in Berlin: ‘To the German people’ [Dem deutschen Volke] or ‘To the German population’ [Der deutschen Bevölkerung]?” Tsafrir Cohen of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation also emphasized that an ethnic justification of citizenship was strongly anchored in the German mainstream until as late as the Red-Green coalition of 1998. A rethink – a reorientation towards a pluralistic model of citizenship based on the French model – did not take place in Germany until the early 2000s.

Eretz Israel versus Medinat Israel

One reason why the question of how to make citizenship in Israel more pluralistic is such a balancing act, Ofer Waldman says, is because the concept of citizenship is so closely intertwined with territorial sovereignty. In response to my question about whether a more inclusive future is conceivable in Israel, he has an unusual answer: “Here I would point to the distinction between Erez Israel and Medinat Israel.”

The Hebrew terms “Erez” and “Medinat” appear to have the same meaning (both mean “country”). But they have different connotations: whereas Erez means the Canaanite ideal of Israel (“from the Nile to the Euphrates”), Medinat refers to the de facto national territory. For Waldman, this distinction raises the question: “Can Israel be a democratic state with equal civil rights for all, with recognized borders and a consensus-based migration policy? Or are we heading towards a Jewish ethocracy?”

The current government’s approach, he says, has devastating consequences for minorities: the rhetoric that has been used against Palestinians in recent decades is now also affecting other minorities. Nevertheless, Ofer Waldman firmly believes in the democratic structures in the country. One area where Israel’s democratic tradition shines particularly brightly is Israeli civil society: “There you see a glimmer of an egalitarian, truly civil

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The “Trump Shift” in the USA

“We may say that we all deserve human rights because we are human beings,” writes the US journalist Masha Gessen in their collection of essays “Living with Exile“, “but in reality only people who are citizens can claim their rights. If human rights are part of being human, then we must face the fact that millions of people without a homeland have been deprived of their humanity.“

The context from which Gessen develops this thought is clear: it is the Trump era; it is the images of separated families on the southern border of the USA. It is what Masha Gessen calls the “Trump Shift“: a shift in the way we talk about migration – where “illegal border crossing“ becomes synonymous with asylum-seeking and a “caravan“ a normal term for refugees. Although Gessen is analyzing U.S. English, these observations also have validity beyond that: German words like “Flüchtlingswellen“ (“waves of refugees“) or “Asylbetrüger“ (asylum cheats) are striking examples of how the rhetoric of dehumanization has also shaped the way people talk about migration in Germany.

In the American context, however, the past few years have shown particularly vividly how language shapes political action. One example was Trump’s comments on the demonstrations in Charlottesville in August 2017, when right-wing radicals demonstrated against the removal of a statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee from 1861. They encountered counter-demonstrators, and riots broke out. Amidst the protests, a right-wing demonstrator raced his car into a group of counter-demonstrators and killed 32-year-old Heather Heyer. President Trump declared: “ “We condemn in the strongest possible terms this egregious display of hatred, bigotry, and violence on many sides, on many sides.“

The fact that he equated these radical protesters, some of whom wore Ku Klux Klan insignia,

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with anti-racists outraged even Republicans. But these statements soon seemed to be just another one of the rhetorical provocations that people had gotten used to.

The dialectic of language and violence, which appears in statements like that one just as much as in the debates about colonial monuments or changes to TV programming in 2020, is noteworthy. In most cases, the latter debates arose from an enhanced understanding of historical or current discrimination against minorities.

The dialectic of language and violence

“There is now so much talk of eradicating the spirit of fascism,” wrote the philologist Victor Klemperer in 1947 in his treatise on the language of the Third Reich “LTI“, “and also a lot of action being taken. War criminals are being sentenced, Hitler squares and Göring streets renamed, Hitler oaks felled.“ The core thesis of his “LIT“, however, was that

the language of the Third Reich ultimately survived not in the form of street names or symbols, but rather in unconscious, seemingly imperceptible expressions, adopted almost mechanically. These expressions, Klemperer said, were actually the stronger of the Nazis' propaganda tools. Language, however, as we know, cannot easily be "overthrown". It had become second nature to the Germans during the Nazi era.

So what, one might ask, would the Klemperian alternative be? A fundamental re-evaluation of the terms we use to talk about racism or discrimination against minorities? A structural reform of our approach to the world [Weltzugang]? Admittedly, we are not currently – neither in the USA nor elsewhere – at the end or in the middle of a dictatorship. Nevertheless, the process that could be described as "language work" seems overdue. The calls for it – often hastily dismissed as "political correctness" by both right and left – are not new. They have just been put forward with a new vehemence this year.

Black Lives Matter

A white policeman's murder of the African-American man George Floyd in May 2020 triggered the largest protests in the United States since the Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, a report by the so-called Kerner Commission found that the United States was "moving toward two societies—a black and a white one, separated and unequal." Although much changed in the decades that followed, the assessment was not entirely wrong either: "race", although not a socially coherent – and certainly not a biologically valid – category, is reflected in the USA as a detrimental factor with regard to the rate of illness and infant mortality as well as in statistics on poverty and unemployment.

The US journalist Jelani Cobb described the Black Lives Matter protests in June of this year as a kind of "American Spring:" George Floyd's name had become a metaphor for racism that had build

up over decades, if not much longer. As Cobb noted, the "revelatory shock" the white public felt after seeing the video of Floyd's death represented a kind of inequality in itself: it was a barometer of the fact that white Americans had hitherto been unburned by the weight of knowledge about the day-to-day reality of racism.

What accounted for the sudden success of the movement in 2020? According to Deva Woodly, a New School professor of politics, the main thing to examine here is the way the movement used social media. Memes in particular, she told *The New York Times*, helped the protestors to codify their message in a new way and kick off debates – offline ones, too – about everyday racism and institutionalized violence.

In the end, though, the murder of George Floyd was not the only spark for the protests. They are difficult to understand outside the context of the pandemic, in which blacks in the USA are dying at disproportionately high rates. To pick up Gessen's thoughts here, the protests showed that human rights, beyond their existence in theory and on paper, are not only decided at the border between citizenship and a lack of a homeland: although blacks in the United States have long since enjoyed civil rights like the right to vote and equality of rights, these remain abstract forms of freedom. In concrete terms – especially when faced with the authority of the state – skin color in the United States is still a determining factor when it comes to depriving someone of a human right, such as the right to physical wellbeing.

A new "we-feeling" in Germany

"Every 'we' is wrong", wrote the publicist Carolin Emcke in her weekly corona diary in April 2020, a few weeks after Angela Merkel's corona speech: "Every 'we' sounds naive at best, ignorant at worst. As if the social, economic, political inequities did not exist. Who is this 'we' supposed to be when the burdens, the privileges, the status are so unequally distributed?" Of course, this idea has to be

understood in the light of a new “we” that became so glaringly apparent in the corona crisis: a kind of crisis-driven coming together as a community. This “we” was not a “we” as a meaningful idea but rather something born superficially from a sudden lack – a lack of contact, consumption, everyday life.

At first there was a feeling that a global humanity, a universalism based on solidarity, could be derived from this “we”. After all, as it turned out, corona actually affected the world as a whole. But on the outer edges of this supposed global empathy emerged in Germany in the following months an opposing and unfortunately much louder voice: the protests of the self-appointed “lateral thinkers” (Querdenker), of the Corona skeptics, of the AfD supporters, and of the conspiracy theorists – even of eco-minded anti-vaxxers and open anti-Semites.

The inflation of this new “we” feeling, as author Max Czollek vividly shows in his latest volume of essays, “Gegenwartsbewältigung” [dealing with the present], went hand in hand with the “protection of the population” on the part of the state, the flip side of which entailed sealing off the nation from the outside as well as withdrawing solidarity within. Czollek argues that groups in the German population who do not participate in it on an equal footing – especially poorer and migrant minorities – were hit harder by the pandemic. He substantiates this in part by citing the sociologist Rainer Geißler, according to whom migrant minorities in Germany “are more often in the lower classes and less often in the higher strata than natives.”

Perhaps the clearest manifestation of how the pandemic hit poorer and less privileged people harder in Germany was school closures. “The Corona situation affects children and young people in very different ways,” confirmed Margit Stumpp, the Green Party’s spokesperson for education policy, in an interview. “Those who live in cramped apartments, without a garden, without internet

access and without a quiet place for homework, who have no parents who can help with reading, physics, and English, they suffered most from educational institutions being closed.”

According to a study by the German Economy Institute, almost 90 percent of families in Germany own digital devices, but low-income earners and families with a migration background are comparatively in a much worse position. Accessing education through homeschooling and learning via Zoom has thus been made considerably more difficult for minorities.

Halle and Hanau as landmarks

A few weeks before the corona pandemic in Germany reached full force in epidemiological terms, a right-wing terrorist had shot and killed ten people in the small town of Hanau in Hesse. Only four months earlier, a thick wooden door was all that prevented a heavily armed Nazi from carrying out an attack on Yom Kippur in a synagogue in the city of Halle.

These two events must be seen as signs of a growing racism and anti-Semitism in Germany. The author and journalist Mohamed Amjahid emphasized to me how important it is to take these signs seriously. “There is currently one party in the Bundestag that openly pursues racist policies, and there are other parties that flirt with such rhetoric. Everyday people of color are attacked in Germany. Unfortunately, even in progressive circles in Germany people prefer to talk, for instance, about Black Lives Matter in America. The problem at home is gladly waved away.”

In general, Amjahid says, the differences between the German discourse on minority and that of the USA are revealing. The decisive difference is that activism in the USA has actually developed from the perspective of the minorities. The principle of the so-called Federalist Papers – one of the foundations of American democracy, according to which each group can promote individual in-

terests – is reflected there in the discourse about ethnic communities.

In Germany, on the other hand, it is downright frowned upon to stand up for the rights of a minority. “Political discussions in Germany,” Amjahid says, “must always be based on the consensus of the majority. There is a kind of levelling, a false egalitarianism there. Behind it is a crude concept of integration as a shared ideal to which everyone must adhere. This of course makes it very difficult for racial minorities to say, for example, we have a problem with police violence.”

In the US, Amjahid adds, one of the reasons why discussions about minority emancipation are so

much further along is that it is more accepted that there are structures that privilege some groups – and not others. “Here in Germany, many people still look at me funny when I use the word ‘white’ as a group name in discussions about racism. The feeling is often: ‘We don’t see skin color.’” In addition, in the German context it is evident that debates about remnants of colonialism and racism regularly provoke a backlash: “You have to see it intersectionally. I am not asking the cashier to engage with anti-racism after eight hours of work. But I do observe a tendency in German society, especially on the side of decision-makers in the media, politics, and civil society, to want to somehow save the status quo”.

Hope in civil society

In preparing this article, I spoke with many people – journalists, authors, politicians. Among them were, occasionally, hopeful voices. Take for instance Maisam Jaljuli, a representative of Israeli civil society, chairperson of the women’s organization Na’amat and activist in organizations such as Standing Together and Sikkuy. “Historically, if we look at our achievements as a minority, we have really achieved a lot,” says Jaljuli, “and done it despite the obvious discrimination. The progress is not due to the government, but because together, as an Arab-Jewish movement, we have tried to influence politics. Today we have 20 percent Arab students at Israeli universities, 60 percent of whom are women. This is a huge improvement.”

Minorities bring diversity

Although the contexts in Germany, the USA, and Israel are of course very different, there seems to be some common ground: as societies that are plural at their core, they are based to a certain extent on the diversity that minorities bring with them. Not to recognize this would be a fatal signal.

The pandemic hit those groups in the German population who do not participate in it on an equal footing harder than others

An open fracture?

Relations between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora have reached an all-time low.

An essay by Benjamin Brown

It was a foreign-policy success for U.S. President Donald Trump: In September, first the United Arab Emirates and, later, Bahrain announced the establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel – a breakthrough for Israel’s foreign policy and validation of Trump as an unconventional „WhatsApp-diplomacy“ deal-broker.


Further states are expected to follow the UAE’s lead: A spokesperson for the Sudanese government announced that Khartoum could imagine a normalization in its relations towards Israel; Lebanese President Michel Aoun cautiously spoke of the possibility of a peace treaty.

These new political developments might not

only bring about peace for the region: The agreement between Jerusalem and Abu Dhabi could also prevent a final breakdown in relations between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora that had been looming for years.

Anger and rage directed at Israeli government policies had most recently come from New York, Paris and Berlin, and had been voiced on the streets of London, São Paulo and Budapest – by allies, who have become increasingly estranged from Israel.

The President of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, Josef Schuster, however, does not believe such alienation is in the offing, stating that he



sees „no noticeable conflict or cooling of relations between Jews living [in the Diaspora] and Israel.“ Israel’s Minister of Diaspora Affairs, Omer Yankelevich of the Blue and White party, would not even comment on the issue.

And yet, in light of recent developments, it is hard to draw any other conclusion than that relations have deteriorated dramatically with Israeli journalist Anshel Pfeffer even accusing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of „doing everything possible to sabotage [the relationship].“

Since the establishment of the state (and indeed previously through the Zionist movement), relations between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora played a vital role in the Jewish state’s self-image. The fate of the Diaspora and that of Israel are, to this day, inextricably linked. Israel’s founding fathers had, however, initially attempted to distance themselves from the Diaspora: The formation of Israel was to go hand in hand with the creation of a „new Jew“ in a „renewed Jewish society.“ The Diaspora, which at the time was perceived as representing weakness and defenselessness due to the fate of European Jews in the Shoah, did not fit into this concept. The ultra-Orthodox Minister Yankelevich argues that the creation of the „resilient new Israeli,“ at the time „came at the cost of a sense of connection to a larger Jewish people.“ Subsequently, Israel’s first governments attempted to keep the Diaspora’s influence on the Jewish state as small as possible.

However, the support received by the young state from, in particular, the Jewish Diaspora in the USA – and the far-reaching potential Israel began to see in it – led to a swing of moods, the Jewish state recognizing the valuable support the Diaspora would be able to provide from abroad. For decades, the relationship was simple: Israel benefitted from the Diaspora’s material and political support, and the Diaspora could rely on finding protection in Israel, should their communities once again face persecution. For Schuster, Israel being „regarded

as an insurance policy, a safe haven,“ is what shapes Israel’s meaning for German Jews even today.

The times, however, in which the survival of the Jewish state was dependent on support by the Diaspora are over. Israel has established itself as a powerful, prosperous and strong regional player, one that confidently occupies a place in the international arena. It is thus no longer dependent on material and political support from the Diaspora. Having been founded „not only to serve as a state for its citizens but as the nation-state of the entire Jewish people,“ Yankelevich believes Israel has an obligation to respond to the needs and concerns of Jews around the world.

Realpolitik comes first

In the Diaspora, however, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s policies are seen as sending a rather different message with representatives criticizing that the Israeli government seems to consider realpolitik relations more important than its alliance with the Diaspora. While there is an ongoing academic debate as to whether the Diaspora could once again grow in importance should Israel find itself in severe economic or foreign policy difficulties, for the moment, the head of government and his cabinet have made a clear decision: realpolitik comes first. And in this realpolitik, the 2020 Diaspora is no longer sufficiently relevant.

Netanyahu’s alliance-building and state visits demonstrate the tension clearly: The Prime Minister maintains friendly relations with politicians such as Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán – much to the dismay of the Jewish communities in these states. Critics in Brazil have repeatedly voiced concerns that Bolsonaro’s pro-Israeli policy is merely an attempt to appeal to Evangelical votes rather than a commitment to Jewish life in the South American country.

The rupture becomes even more apparent in Netanyahu’s relationship with Orbán. The Hunga-

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rian Prime Minister and his Fidesz Party in their fight against George Soros regularly make use of anti-Semitic stereotypes to paint the picture of an all-powerful puppet master with control over the financial world. The cover of a magazine close to the government depicted András Heisler, President of the Federation of Jewish Communities in Hungary, amid similar symbolism: surrounded by banknotes. Budapest rejected criticism that the magazine cover served to stir up anti-Semitic resentment.

The differing assessments of Donald Trump's presidency by Jews in Israel and the Diaspora further illustrate the fracture. While most American Jews do not support Trump and fail to identify with his policies, including those aimed at the Middle East, in Israel, Trump is viewed in a more conciliatory manner. Israeli Jews are mostly grateful to the U.S. President for what they view as a strengthening of Israel's position in the region and in international politics.

It is not, however, merely Netanyahu's foreign policy causing controversy amongst large parts of the Diaspora. Israel's handling of the Palestinian issue is similarly met with incomprehension. Contrary to current Israeli government policy, the majority of the Diaspora supports a two-state solution in which the Palestinians would receive their own, independent state. The lack of a realistic peace plan and the continued construction of settlements further complicate matters, making it difficult for the Diaspora to demonstrate full and unconditional solidarity with Israel.

Jerusalem is very much aware that the annexation of parts of the West Bank could lead to the final rupture between Israel and the Diaspora – this scenario, however, currently seems to be viewed rather indifferently. The lack of media coverage on the cooling of relations in Israel's Hebrew-language press is particularly telling. Elections in Israel are not won by pursuing policies popular abroad – Jerusalem is also very much aware of this.

Although Israel has shelved its annexation plans as part of the peace deal with the UAE, a long-term shift away from the proposed steps would not necessarily spell success for the Diaspora: Israeli policy towards the Palestinians and Netanyahu's friendships with statesmen who flirt with authoritarian rule are in themselves enough to exacerbate the crisis between Israel and the Diaspora.

More differences than similarities

In order to fully comprehend the conflict, it is necessary to consider the different sets of values represented in and lived by Jews in Israel and the Diaspora. The Diaspora, of course, is no homogenous group. And yet, certain political values are shared by the vast majority of these communities.

The latest Knesset elections once again underlined the dominance of a conservative, traditionalist and religious electorate in Israel, while large

parts of the Diaspora pursue an integrationist policy towards Western societies. While the majority of the Diaspora and the vociferous, influential groups, in particular, have a predominantly European-American character, Israeli society is becoming increasingly Oriental-Jewish.

This divide leads to differing societal understandings. Western societies, home to the vast majority of Jews in the Diaspora – the U.S. alone is home to two-thirds according to Stanford University's Berman Jewish DataBank – are largely individualistically oriented. In contrast, Israeli society is described as a structure of a social, Jewish collective.

Speaking about a shared future of the Jewish people – whether they may live in Israel or abroad – is difficult: Yankelevich emphasizes the „historic, meaningful, deep connection“ between Israel and the Diaspora leading to a „shared future [being built] together.“ Yet, whereas in Israel the focus clearly lies on accentuating a national structure, Jewish culture in the Diaspora is frequently manifested by religious affiliation. A national attachment to the State of Israel – self-evidently – hardly plays a role. Israel's ascent to the status of a regional power has contributed to these ruptures in identity. Israel is expanding its influence. The Diaspora, meanwhile, is fighting to maintain the shared identity.

Religious legitimacy debates

The rupture between the current Israeli government and the Jewish Diaspora is not necessarily, however, of a political or identity-related nature. The Western Wall protests demonstrate this in a striking manner, the tensions of this extraordinary conflict on full display at the prayer site in Jerusalem, also known as the Kotel or Wailing Wall. Regular demonstrations, physical assaults and arrests are mere symptoms of this inner-Jewish battle fought between those advocating an orthodox interpretation of Judaism and those calling for

a more liberal, reform-oriented approach to their religion. The question of who is allowed to pray – and when, where and how one may do so – at the Western Wall is pivotal in the ongoing fight. The struggle for control over the Western Wall is by no means merely an inner-Israeli conflict. It also very much concerns the role which Jews from the Diaspora can play in the Jewish state.

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The question of supremacy over the Kotel has been a political issue in Israel for years. The conflict first erupted in 1989 when women's rights organizations in Israel began publicly protesting for women to be allowed to pray along the entire wall rather than in the small, separate area they are confined to until this day. They also demanded that women be allowed to read the Torah at the Kotel and wear the traditional prayer shawl (tallit) and that the ultra-orthodox ban on women praying aloud be lifted.

In recent years, the Diaspora has come into play: Largely unorthodox, its representatives adopted the demands of the „Women of the Wall“ and campaigned for an opening up of the central site of prayer in Judaism. At one point, it seemed as though a solution had been found: In January 2016, representatives of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel and the government agreed to establish a prayer area at the Western Wall where men and women would be able to pray together. A mere 18 months later, however, Israel's cabinet quashed the proposal after protests by the ultra-orthodox parties.

The dispute over the Western Wall regularly leads to protests by Diaspora groups and Israeli feminist movements. Non-orthodox Jews see the government's unwillingness to compromise as a sign of its lack of respect for non-Orthodox Jews. And yet, reducing its decision-making to an attempt by Netanyahu to secure votes would be too easy. There is no denying that such policies can help win (ultra-)orthodox votes and encourage parties to join coalitions. The problem, however, runs deeper: Legitimacy debates and the struggle for interpretative sovereignty are a part of this conflict. The discussion also concerns which political ideas are viewed as legitimate and find their way into society.

The debate around legitimacy gained widespread media attention following reactions to the anti-Semitic attack on the „Tree of Life“ synagogue in Pittsburgh in October 2018 in which eleven American Jews were killed. The refusal of the Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel, David Lau, to call the Tree of Life center a synagogue, instead referring to it as a „place with profound Jewish flavor,“ caused further strife. Lau had avoided the term synagogue due to the center not being an orthodox place of worship.

The controversy surrounding the Pittsburgh attack marked another chapter in the latest conflict between (mostly American) Jews in the Diaspora and the Israeli government and representatives of its religious institutions.

Discussions about a potential fracture between Israel and the Diaspora are particularly gripping in 2020, the year of the U.S. election: While it has become clear that Trump's Israel policies are not aimed at winning over Jewish voters, the campaign instead focusing on Evangelicals, the issues electorally decisive for the Jewish population, which makes up about two percent of the U.S. electorate, cannot be disregarded.

With interest and concern

Relations between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora may have reached a historic low with Israel moving in a political direction with which large parts of the Diaspora cannot identify. It seems unlikely, however, that they will turn their backs on Israel, owing to Israel's function as a safe haven in times of uncertainty and possible persecution.

To Josef Schuster, the future is clear: Israel will continue to play an „ongoing important role“ for the Jewish community in Germany with „relations between Jews living in Germany and Israel very close,“ – „if only because many of them have relatives in Israel and travel to Israel regularly.“ Omer Yankelevich speaks of the „hurt and resentment“ towards one another on both sides in the past – and yet the Minister is optimistic for the future.

The divide between the Diaspora shaped by the West and an increasingly Oriental-Jewish society in Israel creates a cultural divergence with long-term consequences. Nonetheless, studies show that the vast majority of Jews in the Diaspora still consider ties with Israel significant, despite the tense relationship. According to a survey by the Jewish People Policy Institute, two-thirds of both American and French Jews agreed with the statement that interest in and concern for Israel is an important part of their identity as Jews. Jews in the Diaspora are still interested in Israel. And yet they by no means like everything they see.

Beyond Idealization and Alienation

Jewish-Muslim relations in Germany,
Israel and the USA

An essay by Beyza Arslan

At first glance, few relationships seem as conflict-laden as the Jewish-Muslim relationships. The ongoing Middle East conflict in particular contributes to the tense relationship between the two communities. Both sides are characterized by deep resentment towards the respective “Other”. Anti-Semitic attitudes are present not only in the Hamas charter, but also in Islamist movements that brand “the Jews and Israel” as “puppet masters” in their sermons worldwide and declare them to be the eternal enemy.

On the other side we find Jewish voices warning against a supposed “Islamization” – for example in the splinter group “Jews in the AfD” or in the Jewish Review, which reports conspiratorially

about the “Islamic cooperation with the Nazis,” among other things.

Despite all the difficulties, there have been many attempts in recent years to put Jewish-Muslim relations on a firm and lasting footing. Some of them have succeeded: In addition to spectacular gestures like the joint visit to Auschwitz by a delegation from the Muslim World League and the American Jewish Committee, there are also numerous formats in Germany for providing Jewish-Muslim relations with new narratives.

These include podcasts such as the “Mecca and Jerusalem” project at the Heidelberg University of Jewish Studies, which is sponsored by the



Volkswagen Foundation, and events such as the “Jewish-Muslim-Feminist Festival” in Munich. On top of that, there are meeting formats (“Schalom Aleikum” of the Central Council of Jews in Germany) and scientific conventions such as the “Jews and Muslims in Germany” conference in Munich in early 2020.

At the university level, too, attempts are being made to convey a holistic picture of the Middle East and its linguistic, cultural, and political relations, for example in the new joint Middle East Master’s Program of the University of Heidelberg and the Heidelberg School of Jewish Studies.

Learning from America and Israel

What are the special challenges of Jewish-Muslim relations – and what can the Muslim and Jewish communities in Germany learn from other role models? In the following sections, we will take a virtual journey to three different contexts in which Jewish-Muslim relations face their own particular challenges: Germany, Israel, and the USA. And even if religious studies scholar Mehnaz Afridi’s dictum that “You can’t shy away from talking about Israel and Palestine, because then you aren’t being honest” still holds true, the issues involved will often be quite different from those of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Yasemin Soylu, Director of Studies for “Muslim Civil Society” at Teilseind, a Muslim initiative in Heidelberg, observes a gratifying increase in Jewish-Muslim cooperation in Germany: “The courage to approach one another is something I perceive very strongly, at least in civil society organizations that situate themselves as Muslim or Jewish.” Gradually, more and more formats are emerging that give Jewish and Muslim people more visibility. Of course, this does not necessarily mean both religious communities accept every format; but at least in Germany today, it is possible to hold events that would not even have been discussed ten years ago.

Soylu, who with Teilseind is currently setting up a Muslim academy in Heidelberg, has been organizing the Jewish-Muslim Cultural Days for several years (along with co-organizers the Heidelberg University of Jewish Studies, the Kulturhaus Karlstorbahnhof, and the Office for Equal Opportunities). The project emerged from the Jewish Cultural Days and the first Muslim Cultural Days, which were merged in 2017. The interaction of cultural and political education is intended to create

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more visibility for Jewish and Muslim individuals: “We are not interested in finding the Jewish author X or the Muslim actor Y. This is about giving artists and cultural workers a stage, a platform, on which they can give voice to their multiple identities,” says Yasemin Soylu.

The Jewish-Muslim Cultural Days make this

happen with films, music, guided city tours and expert lectures and panel discussions. Soylu emphasizes that this creates spaces where negotiation processes take place and people can also exchange views on subjects they disagree on – for example at the symposium “Jewish and Muslim Positions on the Present” or on guided tours of the city under the motto “Muslim/Jewish Life in Heidelberg“, which took place last year as part of the Cultural Days.

In order to ensure that such events do not remain one-off occurrences, the organizers aim to take people from mainstream society and draw attention to stereotypes about the Jewish and Muslim communities. Given that there are around 99,000 Jews (0.1 percent of the population) and 4.4 to 4.7 million Muslims (5.4 to 5.7 percent of the population) in Germany, this seems particularly important.

The fact that there is anti-Semitic resentment within the Muslim communities cannot be denied; however, it is only one aspect of Jewish-Muslim relations, and it is not a primarily Muslim problem. For example, according to a recent statistic from the Federal Ministry of the Interior, 93.4 percent of anti-Semitic crimes are motivated by extreme right-wing extremism –and these crimes increased by 13 percent from 2018 to 2019. The same can also be observed for Islamophobic crimes, 90.1 percent of which are motivated by extreme right-wing extremism and which increased by 4.4 percent over the same period.

Who are “we” and who are “they”?

“In the beginning we brutally shattered stereotypes and prejudices (...) Internally, the image of the other person suddenly shifted. Secular Jews realized that they are more aligned with secular Muslims than with the religious ones from their own community. There were many issues where suddenly the consensus with the other group was much stronger than with their own. Then, of course, the picture also shifted: Who are we now

and who are they? This is how Ilya Sichrovsky describes the core of the Muslim Jewish Conference (MJC). Sichrovsky is founder and Secretary General of the MJC, an annual six-day conference, which took place in Berlin in 2015 and 2016 and brought together more than 160 young Muslim and Jewish people from more than 65 countries.

The non-profit organization would now like to move its headquarters from Vienna to Berlin in part to establish a “Jewish-Muslim Alliance“ in the city. MJC’s goal is to institutionalize itself and thus be able to act independently and for all age groups. It all began for Sichrovsky in 2009 when he conducted his first longer, deeper discussions with Muslims at an international conference for the University of Vienna. He realized that as a young European Jew he had had no contact with Muslim people so far.

Now, since 2010, he has been organizing the international Muslim Jewish Conference: “In 2010, Jewish-Muslim dialogue was as topical as UFOs. It was not something that was on the agenda in any way, neither in Jewish or Muslim organizations nor in mainstream society“. There were no suitable platforms for open dialogue. But people did have a great need to talk: “This curiosity to finally have the chance to ask a Jew or a Muslim anything you wanted to ask but never could.“

In order to talk about the Middle East conflict or other polarizing issues, he said, one first has to find a common language and build trust. The Middle East conflict was not ignored at the conference; in fact, as Sichrovsky reports, guest speakers from the region addressed it: these were “... mostly representatives of families who have lost people in the conflict. Their brothers, sons, fathers and daughters have died, and they sit in front of this group of young students and tell that, in their experience, the essence of what they have gone through is exactly that: that they are now sitting next to each other and talking to each other. So what is our excuse for not doing it?“

Every year young people returned from the conference and brought their experiences back to their communities, organizations, or cities. As part of the conference, there were visits to Srebrenica (Bosnia) and the concentration camp Mauthausen (Austria). One special moment for Sichrovsky was when Muslims from 40 countries said the Muslim prayer for the deceased in a concentration camp. This gave him access to a completely new emotionality in such a place.

“Golden age” of coexistence

For the religious scholar Afridi, too, remembering the past of both communities together is a central point for achieving fruitful cooperation. “When there was a Muslim ban,” she adds, “there were more Jews demonstrating than Muslims.”

In the USA, Jewish-Muslim cooperation is no longer uncharted territory. However, as a Muslim director of the Holocaust, Genocide, and Interfaith Education Center (located at Manhattan College), Afridi observes that both groups are prone to lose themselves by yearning for supposedly “ideal” periods of coexistence. For example, the so-called “Golden Age” of the Islamic Al-Andalus from 711 to 1492 serves as an example of a “perfect” and tolerant time in which all three religions lived “in harmony.”

In her book “Shoa through Muslim Eyes“, Afridi addresses the problem of the relativization of the Shoah (the Holocaust) within many Muslim communities. There is ignorance among Muslims about the Shoah. People often draw comparisons in order to highlight the problems and suffering of today’s Muslims: “There is always a comparison, which is really weak – my suffering is larger than yours. That’s not how we can have dialogue and peace.” Conversely, however, she often hears accusations from Jewish communities that in light of ethnic conflicts or Islamist terrorist attacks distance themselves from Muslim people.

She sees considerable differences between the USA and Europe as far as Jewish-Muslim relations are concerned. This is not so much due to the differences in the size of the minorities, she argues, even though the Jewish minority in the United States (6.9 million people) is significantly larger than the Muslim minority (3.45 million). It has more to do with American identity, which both communities share despite having different religious roots. Jewish Americans do not merely take to the streets for Muslim people; they are also committed to minority rights in many conflicts, for example in Myanmar, South Sudan, or Xinjiang.

Of course, there is still anti-Semitism among Muslims and Islamophobia among Jewish people, Afridi said. She says that in the USA anti-Semitism is a bigger problem than Islamophobia; however, it is not only attributable to Muslims, but increasingly comes from the ranks of white nationalists. According to the U.S. Department of Justice’s statistics for 2018, 59.6 percent of victims were the targets of so-called hate crimes because of their ethnicity, and 18.7 percent because of their religious affiliation. 53 percent of the perpetrators of these crimes were white, whereas only 24 percent were black and 12.9 percent were classified as “unknown”. Acts against Jewish and Muslim people can also be classified under “race,” since Judaism is not only a religion but also an ethnic group, and Muslims are often victims of hate crimes because of their skin color.

Ari Gordon, Director of Jewish-Muslim Relations at the American Jewish Committee (AJC), therefore emphasizes that both Muslim and Jewish communities are extremely diverse and must be understood in their respective cultural contexts. For example, if one wants to build a relationship based on trust, one cannot equate Turkish-American Muslims and African-American Muslims. Nevertheless, common narratives can be developed.

“Most Jews“, Ari Gordon says, “have sympathy for Palestinians and they want to see a state for Palestinians as they want for Jews“

How common understanding can succeed

These relationships are being put to the test this year amid the corona pandemic, the Black Lives Matter protests, and the US election. Many politicians have tried to polarize both communities and pull them to their respective sides. Yet institutions like the AJC view themselves as strictly apolitical. Ari Gordon argues that religious and national identity should not be in conflict with each other. The strong compulsion to take a position on the Middle East conflict puts considerable pressure on Jewish and Muslim people. Nevertheless, he said, “If we peel the layers of our community – most [American] Jews have sympathy for Palestinians and they want to see a state for Palestinians as they want for Jews.”

At this year’s AJC Global Forum, which was to take place in Berlin 75 years after the war, two special speakers were invited: Secretary General of the Muslim World League Mohammed Al-Issa, and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the United Arab Emirates Anwar Gargash. In addition, AJC, in cooperation with the Muslim World League, organized a visit to Auschwitz-Birkenau in January that was attended by a delegation of about 60 Muslim Saudis.

Ari Gordon describes how religious leaders from Saudi Arabia took the opportunity to commemorate the Holocaust with Jewish people and honored Jewish life the next day at a Shabbat celebration: “As a grandchild of holocaust survivors, I don’t think my grandparents, if they had been alive, could have imagined that the world would look like this.

So understanding can be achieved by bringing together people who set an example. However, the American context is socially and politically different from the German and Israeli contexts. In the latter, the conflict seems inevitable. Many observers assume that Jewish and Muslim people in Israel harbor great hostility for each other and that good relations are virtually impossible, says Arik Rudnitzky, project manager of the Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation at the University of Tel Aviv. Rudnitzky sees the central challenge in research on Jewish-Muslim relations as the management of a national conflict.

Nevertheless: despite the fact that both religious communities see themselves as the real “indigenous” population of the territory, he says, there is currently a growing willingness among some groups to understand the other position. The conflict often does not play a major role on a personal basis or in everyday life, and there are many examples of successful Jewish-Muslim cooperation. Precisely because of the difficult situation with Covid-19, both communities are pleading for more interreligious solidarity. Rudnitzky adds:

“Unfortunately Islamophobia and anti-Semitism are a given in our world of post 9/11 events. This is a given that we have to deal with.

Anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic resentment becomes particularly tangible when the Jewish majority society celebrates its Independence Day in April or May, a day the Palestinians consider “the Nakba” (catastrophe). At Tel Aviv University, too, this is a polarizing period. But that does not change the fact that both groups have to deal with the same problems in everyday university life, Rudnitzky believes. In his eyes, the university campus is a good opportunity to create more encounters and get to know the other community better in everyday life.

Equal rights instead of just side by side

Peaceful coexistence of Jewish and Arab-Palestinian Israelis is an important goal for Mohammad Darawshe too. However, the director of the Center for Equal Rights and Shared Society “Givat Haviva” points out that Arab-Palestinian citizens are concerned about more than just that: they want social equality. At Givat Haviva, Darawshe is trying to break down existing hierarchies in Israeli society.

According to Darawshe, the majority of Arab-Palestinian Israelis are no longer only interested in “eating hummus and falafel together”: “You can agree or disagree, like or dislike each other but you have mutual interests. We share the same economy, environment, government, public transportation, academic system and job market. How do we make it functional? Despite disagreements?”

For Darawshe, even the fact that both Jewish and Muslim people hold on to certain concepts that they consider true and non-negotiable can also be incorporated into a dialogue concept: one does not always have to agree and can “agree to disagree.”

In addition to the promotion of good relations

between Jewish and Muslim communities, Darawshe believes that having equal rights on a social, economic, and political level is essential in order to put Jewish-Muslim relations in Israel on a solid foundation. In the past, people counted only on political education, but the task now is to change politics. The mobilization of civil society (bottom up) is important, but it will not have an effect quickly enough unless certain changes are made on the political side (top down).

Two of the many projects developed in recent years at the Givat Haviva Center stand out: in recent years, among many others: the “Roadmap for a Shared Society”, which sets goals for an inclusive and equal Israeli society, and a school project in which Jewish teachers teach in Arabic-speaking schools and Arab teachers teach in Hebrew-speaking schools. “You normalize the presence of the other without having to make an issue out of it.”

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says Darawshe, “That is the way to fight extremism, you make a different lifestyle.”

Strong alliances

In order to enhance understanding of the meta-level of the various national contexts and forms of interaction, this article sketched Jewish-Muslim relations on the basis of three countries (USA, Germany and Israel). It became clear that many projects and actors in Jewish-Muslim relations go far beyond the stage of an unreflecting session of “kumbaya.” Today, the aim is to build stable relationships that make it possible to talk face to face about current and future challenges. A dialogue based on the concept “imam meets rabbi” is not appealing to everyone.

In Israel the focus has been on relations in the shadow of the Middle East conflict, in the USA on majority-minority relations and hybrid identities (Jewish-American/Muslim-American), and in Germany on the emergence of new forms of solidarity and alliances between Jewish and Muslim communities.

The work of the American Jewish Committee in the United States shows that the institutionalization and networking of large organizations is inevitable, especially when civil society and diplomatic relations are intertwined. In Israel, Givat Haviva tries not only to do educational work, but also to establish the principle of equality on a political level.

In Germany, remarkable approaches have emerged in recent years, but much is still in the negotiation process. That’s in part because of the socio-political differences between Germany and the USA, the different ways of dealing with the construction of national hybrid identities, and the alarming rise in hate crimes and right-wing extremist attacks.

The fact that Jewish life in Germany is often only associated with “stumbling blocks” [Stolper-

steine] or commemorative plaques, or the discussion about whether Islam belongs to Germany or not, makes it difficult for many Jewish and Muslim people to create new narratives that go beyond questions of mere belonging or exclusion.

But what does this mean for the future of Jewish-Muslim relations? In Germany, Muslim and Jewish academies would have to cooperate and receive encouragement from institutions in the majority society. Interreligious cooperation would have to be institutionalized, and education policy would have to promote it and cultivate it in a sustainable manner. Following the example of the AJC in the USA and Givat Haviva in Israel, both leaders and individual multipliers from both communities would have to cooperate and act actively.

“Halle“, “Hanau,“ and the recent attack on a Jewish student in front of a synagogue in Hamburg demonstrate the effects right-wing extremist resentment has on our socio-political life, both for Jewish and Muslim people in Germany.

To use Ari Gordon’s words, “What brings us together is far scarier than what drives us apart.” This observation offers many points of intersection that people have latched on to start a process; now it is time to expand and strengthen these relationships.

“Heimish in the Holy Land”

A research on the descendants of
German Jews in Israel

An essay by Steffi Hentschke


3600 kilometers away from Berlin, a young Israeli is maintaining part of her German family history. Orna Shtarkmann, 36 years old, runs (alongside her mother and one of her two sisters) the Hotel Shtarkmann Erna, one of the oldest hotels in the coastal city of Nahariya. Outside, in the garden of the hotel, palm trees cast long shadows. Inside, in the foyer, framed black-and-white photos on the walls keep alive the memory of a time long gone. “We want our guests to feel, how do you say, at home with us,” says Orna in English. Orna is a petite woman who wears jeans and heels and apologizes for her broken German. “Home” [heimisch] is one of the few words she can remember.

75 years after the end of World War II and 55

years after the establishment of diplomatic relations, the relationship between Germany and Israel can be described as complicated. In bilateral exchanges, both sides always affirm their special friendship with each other. However, outside diplomatic circles, one can observe how both sides are moving away from each other.

German distance

“Unifying Past, Divisive Present“, is the title of the Bertelsmann Foundation study from 2015 that investigated German-Israeli relations. The results indicate that German society has developed a certain distance from this unifying history. For example, 42 percent of Germans at the time believed that today’s relations were only slightly or not at



all burdened by the past, while only 21 percent of surveyed Jewish Israelis shared this opinion.

The discrepancy is particularly visible in the assessment of the Israeli government, which was already led by Benjamin Netanyahu at the time. According to this, 62 percent of Germans had a bad or very bad image of the Israeli government.

On the other hand, the majority of Israelis believed that the United States was Israel's most important ally, while Europe was perceived as an opponent – with the exception of Germany, however. Even though the Bertelsmann study is now more than five years old, there is little reason to assume that this picture has changed fundamentally.

Erna Shtarkmann, the “Jeckete “

What role does the political reality in Israel play in the German-Israeli relationship? What challenges do the political developments in the United States pose for the much-invoked special friendship between the two countries, especially with regard to the way the populations look at each other? And what does it mean when the German public turns away from Israeli reality and keeps its distance from a country whose history is inseparably linked to its own and in which, still today, there are living people who preserve and value this memory? That is the subject of what follows.

The focus will be on Orna Shtarkmann, one of the descendants of more than 90,000 German Jews who immigrated to Palestine between 1933 and 1939 and who, despite the rejection they experienced in their old homeland, have always kept the German language and German traditions as part of their identity. Erna, for example, the grandmother after whom Orna was named and whose hotel the granddaughter still runs today, never learned Hebrew. German Jews in Israel are called “Jeckes”; a proverb says of them: “Jeckes live in a past that never had a future.”

It's a mid-February day this year at the Hotel

Erna, Orna Shtarkmann lets herself fall into one of the velvet-covered chairs in the foyer. The space heater hisses, warming the air in the cool room. They've recently had many unusually rainy days in Nahariya, the city founded by German-Jewish merchants in 1934. The extreme rainfall has caused the river, which divides Nahariya into two parts and is only a few kilometers away from the hotel, to overflow its banks.

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German Jews in
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future“*

Whole parts of the city of 52,000 inhabitants have been washed away; the water has left a trail of devastation and struck a community that has hardly anything to spare in the first place: as in the whole of northern Israel, the economy in Nahariya is weakening, and most of the inhabitants have to commute to Haifa or Tel Aviv in order to make ends meet.

“The government in Jerusalem is not interested in the people in the north,” says Orna, who has a lot to do these days: As a newly elected member of the city council, she is trying to organize aid money from a national fund to help the flood victims; and then there are parliamentary elections in two weeks, the third in eighteen months. Orna supports the Yemina party alliance, which at this time is still part of the coalition with the Likud Party, the party of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Need in the north, boom in the middle

Israel is, as trivial as the phrase sounds, a land of contradictions, and anyone who takes a closer look at it quickly feels as if they're watching table tennis. Just like in the game, views and arguments about what reality is fly from side to side like balls across the table, back and forth, until there's a winner, at least of this round. The north of Israel is suffering under the government's economic policy. While in the heart of the country – in Tel Aviv, Herzliya, Netanya, Jerusalem and even in the desert city of Beer Sheva – high-tech centers are emerging and IT companies are complaining about a shortage of employees, in the regions of the Galilee, which are traditionally characterized by kibbutz agriculture, there is a shortage of impulses and initiatives.

Politically, however, the Likud Party and especially Benjamin Netanyahu enjoy broad support among the Israeli population. In the last election in Nahariya, too, the majority voted for the man who, given his anti-liberal and anti-Arab positions, can certainly be described as a right-wing populist. Yemina, the party alliance that Orna Shtarkmann supports, means “to the right” in English, and it actually stands to the right of Likud. It sees itself as Religious-Zionist, wants to extend the territory of the Jewish state to the Jordan River, and even though it will break up in the coming months and not be part of the new government: Shtarkmann will stay true to the Yemina's values.

From the hotel lobby to local politics

What does it say about a person when they decide to carry on the family heritage and adapt their life plan to the narrow confines of tradition? At the beginning of my research, before the outbreak of the Corona pandemic, Orna Shtarkmann plans to slowly withdraw from the business and devote more of herself to local politics. She wants to promote tourism in Nahariya as the once popular resort hardly attracts any guests anymore.

In recent years Orna, her mother, and her sister have invested a lot of time and money in the renovation of the hotel. The rooms contain old books by Bertolt Brecht and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe; small welcome cards tell the story of the house, the heritage of grandmother Erna.

“During the renovation we changed the name of the hotel“, Orna explains during a guided tour through the simple building with the dark carpets and the soft light. “It used to just be called Hotel Erna, but the Israelis didn't know what to make of the name: that first name doesn't exist in Hebrew. Hotel Shtarkmann Erna was a kind of compromise, which of course is still a liability for me if I want to make a name for myself in politics. Everything I do will fall back on the hotel.“

Erna and Orna sound similar but have very different meanings. The name Orna comes from Or, the Hebrew word for light. Erna is short for Ernestine, the female form of seriousness, and it has exactly this meaning – seriousness in the sense of determination.

On March 2, Israel is to hold parliamentary elections. As in the two previous elections, no clear majorities are coming together. After tough negotiations, the two strongest parties, Likud and Blue and White – the party of Netanyahu's challenger Benny Gantz, which tends to belong to the center-left camp – agree on a coalition. The government is being formed in the crucible of the Corona crisis, which demands quick political de-

cisions and stable political leadership.

In the first weeks of the pandemic, when negotiations are still ongoing, Netanyahu installs an emergency government and imposes a strict weeks-long lockdown on the country. The Ben Gurion airport is closed to travelers from abroad, people are only allowed to leave their homes within a radius of 100 meters, and the prime minister warns citizens that the virus is like the plague: every second person could fall victim to it.

In those weeks Orna Shtarkmann has to put her employees on unpaid leave and sit at the reception herself to process the incoming cancellations. Business delegations from Germany and Austria cancel; about half of the bookings usually come from guests from European countries. The calendar for the year 2020 was nice and full: it could have been a good year for business, a good moment for Orna to make a professional change. Now this desire has been shattered, and as no foreigners have been allowed to enter the country even three months later, Orna has to wonder if the hotel will survive this crisis.

Controversial deal

The pandemic not only upsets individual plans but also brings political projects to a standstill. In the run-up to the Israeli parliamentary elections and with a view to the US presidential elections in the fall, the close friends Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump had presented the so-called Trump Peace Plan at the end of January. Netanyahu had traveled to Washington especially for this purpose. While he and Trump celebrated the plan as the “Deal of the Century,” the ideas it contained met with disapproval in the international community and the EU.

The core of the concept is to extend of Israel's borders into the West Bank, whereby the Palestinians would lose 30 percent of their territory and are meant to form a state in what territory they have left. The plan, which many observers con-

sider a strategic bluff, is forgotten in the first weeks of the pandemic. Only at the end of May, when Netanyahu is officially confirmed as prime minister, does the issue make it back on the agenda: on July 1, the head of government declares that the annexation is to begin. A short time later German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas travels to Israel – he is the first EU politician to do so since the outbreak of the coronavirus – to try to mediate between the Israeli and the international positions. In the process, he has to do something German politicians are reluctant to do in Israel: publicly criticize policy.

Working on the common history

Many of the Jeckes who fled from Germany and Austria to Palestine during the “Fifth Aliyah“, the great wave of emigration between the Nazi seizure of power and the beginning of the pogroms, were not convinced Zionists. Unlike the kibbutzniks, for example, who were already building the first settlements for the future state of Israel, many struggled with their new homeland – with its dry-hot climate in which former doctors and lawyers were now supposed to be farmers – and could only fail.

The first generation of Jeckes honored and respected German culture; and while they had no success cultivating the barren land, the immigrants ploughed the intellectual fields in the young country of Israel, where in the first years after the Holocaust everything German was despised and in the beginning even forbidden.

With the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1965, the Jeckes had the opportunity to come to terms with their history and to build a common future on the basis of their shared past. Exchange programs were quickly established to enable the descendants of the perpetrators to get to know the land of the survivors.

In 1989/90 the entrepreneur and Jecke Stef Wertheimer took over the Jeckes Museum, foun-

ded in Nahariya in 1968, and moved it to Tefen, to the grounds of the Wertheimers Industrial Park. Over the years, this museum, the only one on the history of German Jews in Israel, became a meeting place for German-Jewish intellectuals; the director, Ruthi Ofek, led German diplomats and student groups through the building.

“This annexation? It’s a lot of nonsense”

All public institutions in Israel were closed in March because of the Corona pandemic, and when the doorman is asked months later about the new opening hours, he shakes his head: “The museum no longer exists.” It is June 30, 2020. On

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the following day Netanyahu wants to announce the concrete plans for annexation. On the following day, Ofek’s contract with the museum will be terminated.

“Actually, today is my last working day,” says the 70-year-old in German with a Salzburg accent as she arranges files in her office. Books by German-Jewish thinkers are piled up on the shelves, along with old issues of the magazines Stern and Geo and treatises on the history of German Jews in Israel. The children of the now 94-year-old Stef Wertheimer have decided not to continue with the museum, Ofek says, not wanting to go into detail.

The Wertheimers are one of the richest families in Israel; according to Forbes, their assets amount to about six billion US dollars. The closure is not about money, say people who know more about it, but rather about the question of what relevance the Jeckes’ legacy still has in Israel today. “We had many good years here and I am sure we will find a new location for the museum,” says Ofek. When asked what role political developments in Israel would play in German-Israeli relations, she is less reserved. “You mean this annexation? That’s a lot of nonsense.”

A piece of German comfort

For a few weeks now, hotels in Israel have been allowed to accept overnight guests again. Business at the Hotel Shtarkmann Erna is gradually starting up again. Orna sits at the reception and seems a little exhausted – for the moment she has to get along without employees and to do everything on her own, from the breakfast buffet to room cleaning. She nevertheless takes time for a chat; a friend of her late father has dropped by for coffee. A man whom Orna calls a true Jecke.

“For me, this will always be the Hotel Erna, a piece of German Gemütlichkeit [coziness or comfort],” says the man who was born in Nahariya in the 1950s to some of the first immigrants. While Orna sits on one of the sofas, under the large-framed photos of her grandmother, and tries to follow the conversation in German, the guest tells stories about Orna’s father; about how he fell in love with her mother, an Israeli with Yemeni roots, and how he ran the house with her with German correctness

until his death. “The three daughters are all so pretty and have the best of both sides. But now Orna wants to go into politics... I don’t know. Such a young woman should start a family first, right?”

Orna Shtarkmann sees herself as right-wing, which gets her into trouble with her own circle of friends and that of her parents. It is difficult for the people around her to understand why this non-religious, modern woman is committed to a religious Zionist party. When the guest has said goodbye and the evening has arrived in Nahariya, Orna suggests a walk along the promenade and begins to explain along the way why she has decided so. “I am conservative; I am more interested in the economy than in the conflict with the Palestinians, and if there is something in me that is Jecke, it is my demands for correctness. I would probably also support Likud if Netanyahu were not on trial for corruption. But I cannot choose a man whom I do not consider a good person,” she says – she says the word “person” in German, Mensch.

Polite as a Jecke

There has been a judicial process underway against the prime minister since May, which makes him unelectable in Orna’s eyes. She is convinced that Naftali Bennett, the chairman of Yemina and now an opposition politician, would be a better choice for the office. She feels that he supports her politically, an experience she has rarely had before. “During the elections for the city council, I felt that not only the religious but actually politicians of all parties had a problem with me. Simply because I am a young woman. The fact that Bennett is fighting so hard for annexation is okay with Orna. “It’s not my top priority, especially in times of corona. But I’m basically in favor of it.”

In Israel they say the Jeckes are particularly conscientious and reliable. Whereas the immigrants from Germany were initially met with skepticism – people sometimes poked fun at the always neatly dressed new Israelis – the word Jeckes has taken on a positive connotation today; it

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is a synonym for special politeness. The values of the German Jews have never been able to assert themselves in political terms; the mixture of conservatism and restraint was not capable of gaining a majority in Israel.

Linde Apel, the director of the Workshop of Remembrance at the Research Center for Contemporary History in Hamburg, interviewed several first-generation Jeckes for her essay “Die richtigen Jeckes sind andere“. One of the answers she received was: “It wouldn’t have harmed our Israelis if they had had a little bit of the Jeckes about them, but the Jeckes were not very popular here. We didn’t have anyone in the government either. Only here and there one took a wrong turn and ended up in politics. No, they really weren’t cut out for it.”

In mid-July, one of the parties leaves Yemina, and Naftali Bennett and the other party leaders continue with their opposition policy, which is supposed to offer a more right-wing alternative to Likud. In those weeks, protests against Benjamin Netanyahu and the difficult economic situation began throughout the country. As a result of the corona crisis, more than 850,000 Israelis have lost their jobs, and the number of bankruptcies has shot up by 75 percent compared to the previous year.

The anger at “Bibi“, as Netanyahu is called, is considered the lowest common denominator among protesters, who meet in their thousands every week in front of the Prime Minister’s residence and shout “Bibi, go home.“ Among the demonstrators are also alienated Likud voters who carry their message on their posters: “I am not a leftist just because I am against corruption.“ A debate will soon begin in the Israeli media on the question of what consequences the largest protests in eight years could have for the country. There is speculation in the left-wing daily Haaretz that the answer could lie to the right of Likud, with Yemina.

Surprising agreement

In mid-August US President Donald Trump made the relatively surprising announcement that Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) had reached a peace agreement under the mediation of the United States. Observers interpret the announcement as the American president’s last attempt to improve his prospects for re-election. Time is running out before the vote in November, and unlike before the pandemic, the polls look bad for the Republican.

In Israel, too, reactions are divided: the left considers the declaration a diversionary tactic, since the country has informally had good relations with the UAE for years. Naftali Bennett is also critical, since in the course of the negotiations Netanyahu declared that the annexation plans would be put on ice. “It is tragic that Netanyahu did not seize the moment and did not have the courage to ex-

tend the sovereignty of the country of Israel even a centimeter.“

Orna Shtarkmann runs for office

Back in Nahariya at the Hotel Shtarkmann Orna, one last time. It is summer vacation in Israel. And because the airport is still closed, the Israelis are vacationing in their own country this year. Orna has already been up since four o’clock, and for the first time in years all rooms are fully booked for August. The past weeks have changed her view of her work, she says. The positive feedback from the guests, the high praise for the clean rooms and the fresh apple strudel have given her new motivation.

“I am proud of what we have achieved here, that we can continue my grandmother’s legacy,“ she says, telling us that she also made a decision on her political work. “That’s why I spoke to Naftali Bennett on the phone this morning; I hope he will support me,“ says Orna and smiles like someone who has a surprise to announce: in two years, mayoral elections are due again in Nahariya, the city of the Jeckes. Orna Shtarkmann wants to be the first female candidate for the office.

The Jewish Identity Post WW2: Why America?

Is|rae|li

a native or inhabitant of Israel, or a
person of Israeli descent

An essay by Noa Rekanaty


I was born and raised in Israel, one of the most conflicted areas in the world. Living with and inside this conflict, with my two loving parents, and two younger twin sisters, life was great. As I grew up I've learned how to cope with the terror, grief, and events, who made me who I am today and shaped my traits and identity.

There was one thing I started to realize after I had finished my service at the IDF, while traveling the world. I noticed there were so many different people, that are exactly like me – Jewish, but still different, in the sense of how they grew up and how their family's life and legacy influenced their own identity.

American Jews, for example, who grew up celebrating the same holidays and singing the same

songs as me, did not have to go into the military by law, which is another aspect of who I am. While meeting and interacting with those different Jewish communities, I have learned that there is such a great difference between one another and noticed how the Jewish narrative and inter-generational Jewish identity, especially after the holocaust, differs in each community and family living around the world, influencing the newer generations of those who had escaped and survived.

In the light of the holocaust, which my own family had been through, I started not only questioning my own identity and "Jewishness", but I also started questioning why my family had made this choice of immigrating to Israel, and how it shaped my own identity and "Israeliness". I had



always wondered what it would be like to be born in America and living my Jewish life in a slightly different angle, with other identity components.

After asking myself and my surroundings those questions, is when I started looking into politics and different processes in the world, and how those change our identities and impact our lives, especially after a big crisis like the holocaust.

In this article, I would like to explore the Jewish identity of the members of one family, over three generations, and what made them choose to leave Europe after the holocaust and adapt to a new place – America. How did the new generations develop their own identity in a new place while growing up Jewish? I hope I will be able to answer my own questions, with another family's story.

Almeir|ca

The events in Europe under the Nazi regime had an effect on many Jews, which later on became refugees when they had lost their home while escaping the Nazis. After the holocaust, there were between 7-8 million displaced people in Germany and the surrounding territories. Out of this big number, there were about 50,000 Jews (She'erit Hapletah) who had survived the horror.

Those circumstances had turned Joe Adamson's life upside down, leading him to fleeing to different places in order to stay alive. With every move, Joe had to re-adapt, learn a language, culture, and a new way of being just Joe, out of his natural element. Joe is a wonderful man whom I had the pleasure to interview for this article, as well as his two sons, Peter (1958) and Allen (1955), and his grandson Eric (1991), which I will get back to later on.

When I first spoke to Joe (Ernst) Adamson in order to hear about his journey, I was amazed by his story and courage. Life had its own plans for him, as he escaped from the Nazis and luckily had his life saved by a chain of events. Joe was born in 1924 in Königsberg (Kaliningrad) to a very proud family with a strong German heritage. His grandfather worked as a councilman for the city's government, as well as his father who owned a

metal manufacturing plant.

When the Nazi regime rose, Joe, his mother, and his two sisters moved to Frankfurt Oder, to live with their grandparents, and that was when things began to change for the family. Joe was now called a "Judenjunge" ("Jew boy") and got beat by the older children at school for being a Jewish child. Not too long after Joe's Bar Mitzva in 1938, the "Kristallnacht" occurred – a pogrom against the Jews which included breaking into Jewish owned buildings, synagogues and stores, and burning them to ashes. His two uncles were taken away to Dachau concentration camp, and Joe's house which he was living in at the time was destroyed. That was the moment that Joe's mother decided to leave Germany, but too many countries were now rejecting the Jews and not giving any entries visas.

In August of the same year (1938), Joe managed to get on the Kindertransport to London, to live with distant relatives. It was difficult to obtain a spot on the train, and it took some family connections to make it work. The Kindertransport was an early mission to get Jewish children out of their countries and take them to a safe heaven, in order to escape the Nazis. England was then Joe's new home, which he considers his forever home, besides his home in Connecticut, where he lives today. Back then, Joe did not know what was about to happen to 6 million Jews.

In England, Joe had to learn English and adapt to a new culture as he attended a local school. When things got worse and Germany threatened to invade England, the family evacuated to the countryside in England, and when Joe was only 16, he stopped attending school and started working. His mom and sisters had joined him at the time, and they moved to London. They all needed to work very hard but were grateful for their life that was given to them as a gift.

Joe was in his 20's when he met American soldiers and got the opportunity to join a special division of the American Air-Force, as an interpreter and an investigator of Nazi crimes. With his new division, he traveled to Austria and saw with his own eyes for the first time what the Nazis had done

and understood the deep effect on the Jews and different minorities who had been murdered in the holocaust.

In 1949, Joe immigrated to America, and arrived in New York, where he started his new life. After many years in Germany and England, he had to adapt once again, but now for good. When I asked Joe – why America, his answer was simple: opportunities. Joe had left to the United States in order to change his life, since England was not providing opportunities for those who needed them.

*What influence
does life have
in a completely
new country on
the own identity,
traditions and
history of a person?*

For many Jewish refugees America has been an opportunity to start over, where they knew that opportunities and a relatively big Jewish community are awaiting. Between 1945 and 1952, the US had admitted in approximately 400,000 Jews, who now had a new home in America, and were expected to blend with the existing community. Surprisingly,

Joe says that “the German Jews were not accepted by the American Jewry“. German Jews were the largest Jewish immigration wave to the US after the holocaust and were diverse with their own background and cultures from the Jewish-American community which was already there. According to Joe, the existing American-Jewish community back then did not want anything to do with the German Jews, who were on their own and separated from them as the local American- Jews were considered an “upper class“ and rejected the new wave of Jewish immigration from Germany, and the surroundings. Although Joe fled from Europe, the Antisemitism and minority hatred from non-Jews was waiting there, as people of color were suffering from the same issue. The newly immigrated Jews themselves, were experiencing a rejection from the local Jewish community. Those factors pushed the next generations to “Americanize“, and that made a difference in the identity of the first American generation – the children of the Jewish immigrants.

identity

When I spoke to Joe’s sons, Allen and Peter, they told me about their lives as Americans. Their childhood was enormously different than their father’s – they lived with parents who had immigrated, in a bilingual home, with a thick German accent as the melody at home. But their life was completely American and was not influenced by their father’s story – hamburgers and fries for dinner and less European food. At home, there was never a feeling of anger towards Germany, as the holocaust and stories were not a central part of the family’s home, but the European identity of both parents (both were German) was still there. Peter and Allen do not consider the German part of their identity as a big influence, as they see themselves as first generation Americans to parents who immigrated.

As for their identity, being American is an identity that for them comes first before being Jewish. Growing up in a local town knowing everyone, was a very lucky time to be alive, a time that made them more American than European. Although the

parents were Europeans (Germans), the environment played a major role in their identity, rather than being born Jewish or German.

modern

A “Voluntary Jew” as the historian Diana Pinto defines, are the European Jews who are now living in the EU since after the war. It also refers to the Jews who chose to immigrate to the EU out of a free will and live there while dealing with the consequences of the war, which left a mark on the Jewish community forever. When I spoke to Eric, Joe’s grandson and Peter’s son, who now lives in Berlin, I wanted to understand where he stands as a second generation American. Eric is half Swedish, as his mom immigrated and converted to Judaism in order to carry on the Jewish legacy. Eric does feel like an American, with European roots as he speaks Swedish fluently. His American identity shaped who he is rather than being Jewish, when growing up in America. He describes the Jewish community as an integral part in the American society, with a large presence in business, film, and culture, so being Jewish for him was a “secondary” thing. After college, Eric moved to Germany out of a will to learn about European culture and politics, and not necessarily because his grandfather was born there. That was where he felt the different attitude towards Jews for the first time – in both countries Jews are a minority, but in Germany they feel it, unlike in America where it is very casual to be Jewish.

Today, Eric considers himself as an American, and lives like a European as it has a strong influence on his identity – speaking Swedish and living in Europe for a while. Eric tells that he is more associated and connected with locals rather than Americans and Jews. He does not feel like he is surrounded by foreigners, as he is a European himself, which makes it easier to connect and relate to the local surroundings. For him, America today is less of an attractive option, and he sees himself staying in Europe in the near future. After speaking to three generation, who are only one family out of many, I noticed a few interesting things.

For the first generation, Joe, America was an opportunity; a place where he could settle and start a new chapter, raise children and live peacefully. For the second generation, and first-generation Americans, Peter and Allen, being American is their primary source of identity; growing up in an American scenery, to immigrant parents – the new home for them is the home of the children. Eric, the third generation, has an American identity, with a strong European influence on his identity, unlike his father and uncle. Part of this influence is his proficiency in Swedish and growing up on some of the culture’s mannerism.

The first generation opened an “identity window” for the next generation, who identify as Americans, and the next one, going back to Europe, as the world today is global and there are many options. Where the three generations see their home suits perfectly with their evolvement of their identity, as an intergenerational phenomenon. Joe describes his home in England – where he got his life as a gift, and in Connecticut where he happily lives now. Allen and Peter see America as their home, with a strong touch on the family unit as a home, whereas Eric sees Germany and Europe as his current home. So, what would it have been like for me? Maybe it would have been an opportunity for my parents, as many Israelis left when the second Intifada began in 2000. I would have gone to an American school, but at home would have experienced flavors and memories from far away. I would have celebrated Hanukkah with my family, and Christmas with my friends.

But one thing I know now – European immigrants saw an opportunity in America, a place to reset their life after a crisis. A place where their children and grandchildren would have the freedom to choose and develop their own identity without being afraid of being “different”.

Sylke Tempel said: “The big, almost a bit structural, disadvantage of democracies (...) is that our means are relatively limited. What we don’t want is, because it went completely wrong, some kind of democratization through violence. We can’t do that. So it always has to be persuasive.”

Publisher

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PRINTEC OFFSET > medienhaus
Ochshäuser Str. 45 | 34123 Kassel

Distribution

IPS Pressevertrieb Hamburg GmbH
Nordendstraße 2 | 64546 Mörfelden-Walldorf

Frequency of publication

several times a year

Unit price Magazine IP	14,90 €
Unit price IP Special	9,90 €
Annual subscription Germany	118,00 €
Annual subscription foreign countries	128,00 €
Airmail	155,00 €
Student subscription	73,00 €
Student subscription foreign countries	83,00 €
(Proof required)	
Trial subscription (2 issues.)	19,50 €
All subscriber prices include shipping costs and VAT. Further prices on request. Cancellations up to four weeks before the end of subscription period. Special subscription prices apply for members of the German Council on Foreign Relations.	

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Picture credits

All illustrations: Jaime Brehme
Page 5: Atlantik-Brücke e.V.

Editorial deadline for this issue:

October 12, 2020.
www.internationalepolitik.de
ISSN 1430-175X



This issue was realized with the kind support of
LOTTO-Stiftung Berlin.

The Fellows 2020



Beyza Arslan completed her bachelor's and master's degree in cultural mediation, intercultural communication and comparative linguistics in Heidelberg. She works as a research assistant at

the Heidelberg University of Jewish Studies on the podcast project „Mecca and Jerusalem“ (funded by the Volkswagen Foundation). The podcast is also produced in cooperation with Hessischer Rundfunk and focuses on Jewish-Muslim relations.



Itamar Ben-Ami is a PhD student at the Institute of Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a graduate of the orthodox Yeshiva world. His dissertation focuses on critical

and theocratic conceptualizations of the modern sovereign state with a focus on German-Jewish scholars in the Weimar Republic. Research Interests: Intellectual history, political theology, critical political theory and conceptual history.



Benjamin Brown is a British-German journalist and student of political science, economics and history. He has worked for the dpa, the Tagesspiegel, ARD and the Israeli News Agency,

among others. After completing his studies at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, he will pursue a MSc in „Modern Middle Eastern Studies“ at the University of Oxford.



Hanno Hauenstein is an author and journalist living in Berlin. He is founder and editor of the German-Hebrew art magazine aviv Magazine.



Steffi Hentschke is a freelance reporter and reports mainly on Israeli politics and culture for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, Die Zeit / Zeit Online and GEO Reise. She holds

a Master of Arts degree in political science from the University of Hamburg and a degree in journalism from the Henri Nannen School. She currently lives in Tel Aviv.



Noa Rekanaty is a B.A. student at the Lauder School of Government of IDC Herzliya. She is a committed activist and advocate for Israel through engaging in various social organizations and

writing articles. She plans to work as a lecturer and lawyer at various institutions after obtaining her master's and doctoral degrees.

Cooperation partners

The **German-Israeli Future Forum Foundation** brings together professionals and executives from Germany and Israel who take on responsibility and champion the democratic organization of our societies. We support multipliers from Germany and Israel and fund bilateral projects that contribute to shaping the present and the future of German-Israeli relations in a sustainable manner.

The **American Jewish Committee (AJC)** was founded in New York in 1906 by American Jews, predominantly of German origin, with the aim of providing Jewish security and promoting democracy, human rights, and international understanding worldwide. For more than a hundred years the AJC has promoted democracy, pluralism, and human rights. Following the visions of its founders, the AJC is committed to a mutual understanding of nations, religions, and ethnic groups.

ELNET Deutschland e.V. is a non-profit and independent organization that aims to promote German-Israeli relations in a non-partisan manner on the basis of common democratic interests and values. Alongside our partner offices in Brussels, Paris, Warsaw, and Tel Aviv, we strengthen the dialogue between European and Israeli decision-makers in politics, economy, and society. In addition, we support existing networks and expands these through strategic dialogues and traveling delegations.

Internationale Politik (IP) is Germany's leading foreign policy journal. It starts off where the news stops. Experts from politics, business, science and the media write about the broad spectrum of international relations in the form of analyses, essays, interviews, and commentaries. The IP was founded in 1945 under the name Europa-Archiv. It appears in print every two months and online in German and English (Internationale Politik Quarterly). Published by the German Council on Foreign Relations (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.), IP is available by subscription and sold at bookstores found in railway stations and airports throughout Germany.

Women in International Security (WIIS) e.V. is a non-profit association and a union of women involved in foreign, security, and defense policy. The goal of the association is to give greater consideration to women's interests in international and national foreign and security policy and to support women working in these fields and help them build networks. The headquarters of WIIS is in Washington, D.C., and the association is represented internationally by 22 „National Chapters“.



ATLANTIK-BRÜCKE

The Sylke Temple Fellowship Program 2020 is under the patronage of
Sigmar Gabriel, Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke e.V.





Dr. Sylke Tempel (1963–2017) was editor-in-chief of **IP** from 2008 until her death. In addition to the fellowship, whose works from the 2020 volume are collected in this issue, an essay prize is awarded annually in her name to honor the life and work of this outstanding journalist, author, publicist and mentor. She is missed.

